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1. The Problem of the Many 
Think of Mont Blanc, with its rabbits and foothills and its slurries of 
moistened rock. We can carve up the reality around Mont Blanc in 
different ways. If we are hunters, we might include rabbits as parts of 
the mountain; if we are geologists we might include only rock, perhaps 
together with a certain amount of air in the crevices and tunnels which 
have been formed beneath the mountain surface; if, on the other hand, 
we are soil chemists we might include also a surrounding thin layer of 
organic matter; if we are skiers, we will want some snow; and if we are 
French or Italian government surveyors, then our respective maps of 
the mountain might include slightly different determinations as to 
where, precisely, its borders lie. If we are armed with a microscope we 
will discover that, the closer we approach the surface of the mountain, 
the more questionable does the belongingness or non-belongingness of 
microscopic particles to the mountain itself begin to appear. What 
could make it true, given some atom or molecule very near the surface 
of the mountain, that it is, or it not, a part of the mountain? Reflection 
on such puzzles suggests the hypothesis – expounded in the literature 
on vagueness under the heading ‘supervaluationism’ – that there is no 
single answer to the question as to what it is to which ‘Mont Blanc’ 
refers. Rather there are, at any given time, many answers; many parcels 
of reality that deserve the name ‘Mont Blanc.’ 
Something similar applies also to you yourself, and indeed to every 
other organism. When you refer to John, you do not think of all the 
parts of John or of his immediate surroundings. You do not think of the 
cells in John’s arm, or the fly next to his ear, or the neutrinos that pass 
through his body. These things do not fall under the beam of your 
referential searchlight. Rather, they are traced over. John is 
apprehended by you as a single, unitary object. His dermatologist, 
though, has a different perspective, for he is all too well aware that, like 
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Mont Blanc, John has questionable parts and that there are at the 
molecular level many overlapping aggregates of matter all of which 
have a claim to being John. Notice that this is not an epistemological 
matter. Even an omniscient being would be in the same predicament as 
you or me as concerns where the boundaries of John, or Mont Blanc, 
precisely lie. 
That John is losing or gaining molecules from one moment to the 
next is however of no consequence for our everyday purposes: it falls 
below our normal threshold of concern. Our cognitive habits have thus 
developed in such a way that they relate to reality in a coarse-grained 
fashion, and this allows us to ignore questions as to the lower-level 
constituents of the objects foregrounded by our referential searchlight. 
This in its turn is what allows such objects to be specified, not 
precisely, but rather in such a way that a range of alternative but nearly 
identical objects are simultaneously comprehended within the scope of 
what we see or refer to. We do not recognize this ‘many’ because we 
are focused, precisely, on those parts and moments of the matters in 
hand which lie above the pertinent granularity threshold. On the level 
of granularity we embrace in our everyday cognitive activities it is as if 
there is just one object which serves as the focus of our attentions. 
The acts in which we make reference to objects in reality thus bring 
about a partitioning of reality into two domains: the foreground 
domain, within which the relevant object is located, and the 
background domain, which comprehends all entities left in the dark by 
the operating perceptual or referential searchlight. But how is this 
partitioning to be understood? Certainly it cannot be understood in 
terms of any simple pigeonholing of reality into jointly exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive parts, either of the sort that is involved in a system 
of categories like that of Aristotle or of the sort that underlies the 
periodic table of the chemical elements. Nor can the foreground-
background partition be understood along geographical lines (by 
analogy with the sort of partition which might be depicted on a map). 
Thus it is not as if one connected, compact (hole-free) portion of reality 
is set into relief in relation to its surroundings, as on old maps of the 
known world surrounded by terrae incognitae, or on contemporary 
maps in which Beverly Hills is represented as something which is set 
into relief within the wider surrounding territory of Los Angeles. For if 
an object is included in the foreground domain, this does not imply that 
all the parts of the object are also included therein. This is because each 
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partition comes with its own granularity, and this means that it does not 
recognize parts beneath a certain size. It is for this reason that each 
partition is compatible with a range of possible views, and indeed with 
no view at all, as to the ultimate constituents of the objects included in 
its foreground domain. 
2. The Granularity Problem Posed 
If, however, partitions are effected not in any simple geographical way, 
but rather in such a way as to be marked by a certain granularity, then 
this brings a serious problem for our standard views of how reference 
and perception work – a new variant on older problems connected with 
intensionality, opacity and substitution. The problem turns on the fact 
that the relation of a part to its whole is transitive. Consider the 
question of what Mary sees when she sees John raising his hand. The 
following must all simultaneously be true: 
 
 A. The molecules inside John are parts of John. 
 B. John is part of what Mary sees. 
 C. The molecules inside John are not a part of what Mary sees. 
 
These sentences cannot be simultaneously true in the presence of the 
(independently attractive-seeming) principle of the transitivity of 
parthood: 
 
 D. If x is part of y, and y is part of z, then x is part of z. 
 
Counterpart triads can be constructed in regard to a host of other types 
of entities: truthmakers, facts, states of affairs, situations, surfaces, 
aspects, pluralities, shadows, visual fields, persons, Husserl’s 
‘noemata’, Kant’s ‘phenomenal world’, Fine’s ‘qua objects’, and so on. 
Thus, for example, we might have: 
 
 A′. The molecules inside John are parts of John. 
 B′. John is part of what makes it true that John is raising his hand. 
 C′. The molecules inside John are not a part of what makes it true 
that John is raising his hand. 
 
Clearly if we are to do justice ontologically to the facts of granularity, 
then some way must be found to explain how the sentences in each of 
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these triads can be simultaneously true, and this means that some way 
must be found to block the transitivity of parthood (thus for example to 
block the move from ‘x is visible’ and ‘y is part of x’ to: ‘y is visible’). 
We can formulate an analogous triad also in relation to entire domains, 
for example in relation to the domain of what might be called 
‘common-sense reality’: 
 A″. The molecules inside John are parts of John. 
 B″. John is part of common-sense reality. 
 C″. The molecules inside John are not a part of common-sense 
reality. 
One way to resolve the problem is to refuse to take expressions like 
‘fact,’ ‘sense datum,’ ‘what Mary sees,’ or ‘common-sense reality’ 
seriously as referring to special sorts of entities. One is then simply not 
allowed to ask, for example, whether molecules of paint are or are not a 
part of the sense data which John sees when he focuses on a painted 
wall. To suppose that a part-whole relation might obtain (or not obtain) 
here is to be guilty of what some like to call a ‘category mistake’. 
Those interested in ontology will however persist in raising such 
questions nonetheless, which means that in regard to some, at least, of 
the types of entities mentioned, they will take such entities 
ontologically seriously. Sentences involving category mistakes (for 
example ‘cardinal numbers are green’) they will classify simply as 
unproblematic falsehoods. One standard ontological approach utilizes 
the phrase ‘under a description’ or some comparable locution. The idea 
is that it can be the case that some given molecule is part of John under 
one description (for example: physical body), but that it is not a part of 
John under some other description (for example: object visible with the 
naked eye). Again, however, ontological persistence reveals a problem 
with such approaches. For if John under these different descriptions is 
indeed one and the same entity, then he thereby also has, under each 
description, all the same parts. If, on the other hand, John under this 
description is a different entity from John under that description, then 
we are still in need of an account of how this difference is to be 
understood, and this brings us back to the puzzling triad with which we 
again. 
Another popular starting point for the resolution of our puzzle rests 
on using set theory as a means of blocking the principle D. of the 
transitivity of parthood. The set-membership relationship is after all not 
transitive. But to use set theory as a means of blocking transitivity 
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brings too great a cost. For if set theory is taken realistically, then this 
forces us to identify Urelemente – elements of sets which are not 
themselves sets – from out of which the larger worldly structures which 
concern us would be constructed by set-theoretical means. But what 
would such elements be in the case of a complex event such as John 
raising his hand? And even if appropriate elements – ultimate sub-
atomic particles, for example – did present themselves for purposes of 
set-theoretic reconstruction, problems would still arise because we 
would then find that our ontology is cluttered with multiple copies of 
reconstructed objects existing at different times and at different levels 
of granularity (for example, John as set of atoms, John as set of 
molecules, John as set of cells; this set of atoms at a time when it 
constitutes John, this same set of atoms at a time when its elements are 
scattered to the four winds; and so on). This problem of supernumerary 
copies does not arise for standard theories of part and whole, since the 
mereological sums of the atoms, molecules, cells, and so forth 
constituting John at some given time are all one and the same object. It 
is precisely this, however, which makes the mereological approach 
susceptible to the puzzle captured in our triad. Mereology as an 
instrument of ontology is, furthermore, in no better a position than set 
theory when it comes to the problem of doing justice to the fact that 
John preserves his identity from one moment to the next even in spite 
of the fact that he gains and loses parts. 
3. The Granularity Problem Solved 
Consider what happens when you observe a chessboard. You are 
working with a partition of the world into that, in the region of the 
chessboard, which you are focusing on, and that which is traced over. 
Your focus brings with it, again, a certain granularity: you are 
interested, not in the atoms or molecules within the board and its 
pieces, but rather only in the board and the pieces themselves. 
Moreover, you are interested in the latter not as constituting a mere list, 
or set, but rather as they exist within a certain arrangement. The board 
is divided into squares. In some of these cells pieces of specific kinds 
are located. 
To understand what is going on here, we need to focus in more 
detail on the notion of a partition and on the associated notion of cell. 
The first thing that we need to recognize is that partitions have their 
granularity built in, as it were, from the very start. An administrative 
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map of France depicting its 91 départements or its 311 arrondissements 
provides a close approximation to a partition in the sense we have in 
mind. Such a map is the result of applying a certain coarse- or fine-
grained grid of cells – the minimal units of the partition – to a certain 
portion of reality. 
A partition is the ontological analogue of the sort of labeled grid we 
might find in a large post office or automobile component warehouse. 
For a partition to do its work, it needs to have cells large enough to 
contain the objects that are of interest in the portion of reality which 
concerns us; but at the same time these cells must somehow serve to 
factor out the details which are of no concern. A partition is 
accordingly a device for focusing upon what is salient and also for 
ignoring or masking what is not salient. We can think of it as being laid 
like a net over whatever is the relevant object-domain, and, like a net or 
grid (or a latticed window of the type depicted in Renaissance manuals 
of painting), it is to a large degree transparent. Thus, importantly, it 
does not in any way change the objects to which it is applied. The sorts 
of carvings up of reality which are effected through our partitions are 
comparable, not to those effected by surgeons, but rather to those we 
find in atlases of surgical anatomy, or indeed in the various tables of 
categories prepared by Aristotelian philosophers and by Linnaean 
biologists. 
A partition is like a map. It is an artifact of our perceiving, judging, 
classifying or theorizing activity, and it exists only as a product of the 
cell boundaries by which it is determined. The reality partitioned, in 
contrast, is what and where it is, and it has all its parts and moments, 
independently of any acts of human fiat and in dependently of our 
efforts to understand it theoretically. Granularity as it has been treated 
in the above is thus properly at home precisely in the realm of our 
partitions: granularity pertains not to the objects themselves on the side 
of reality, but rather to the ways we partition those objects in different 
sorts of contexts. 
The arrangement of cells in a partition may be purely spatial, as in a 
map, where the relative positions of neighboring cells are determined 
by the corresponding positions of those portions of geographic reality 
to which the cells relate. Or it may be determined by a linear ordering, 
as for example where partitions are determined via quantitative scales 
reflecting age cohorts or temperature bands. The arrangement may also 
be determined in more complex (for example hierarchical) ways, as in 
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the case of a partition determined by biological kinds (for example a 
multi-level partition of the animals in your local zoo into lions, tigers, 
spiders, small marsupials, vertebrates, and so on). The partitions which 
come closest to sets (or to mere lists) are those associated with our uses 
of proper names, partitions which we are able to project onto reality in 
such a way that their cells keep track of the corresponding objects in 
the world as objects that are identical from one moment to the next, and 
this in spite of the fact that these objects change and that parts are 
gained and lost. 
Complex multidimensional partitions arise through the combination 
of these different types of demarcations and cell arrangements. A map 
of the zoo, for example, might indicate not only the places where 
animals are located but also the sorts and sizes and proper names of the 
animals which are located in those places.  
4. Towards a Theory of Partitions1 
The cells in a partition may have sub-cells. Thus, for example, the cell 
rabbit is a sub-cell of the cell mammal in a partition of the animal 
kingdom. The cell Florida is a sub-cell of the cell United States in the 
standard geopolitical partition of the surface of the globe. The sub-cell 
relation is then an analogue of the sub-set relation in standard set 
theory. An example of a chain of cells ordered by the sub-cell relation 
is your address (The Oval Office, The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20500, USA). 
Those cells in a given partition which have no sub-cells within that 
partition are called minimal cells. The closest counterparts to sets 
within our present framework are those ideal sorts of partitions which 
                         
1The formal details underlying the ideas in this section are set out in Thomas Bittner 
and Barry Smith, “A Taxonomy of Granular Partitions,” in Spatial Information 
Theory, Proceedings of COSIT 2001, Morro Bay, September 2001, ed. Daniel Mon-
tello (New York: Springer, 2001). They were inspired on the one hand by the theory 
of location developed by R. Casati and A. C. Varzi, Parts and Places. The Structures 
of Spatial Representation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), and on the other hand 
by the machinery of granular partitions in R. Omnès, The Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Omnès’ theory is sum-
marized in the forthcoming B. Smith and B. Brogaard, “Quantum Mereotopology,” in 
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (forthcoming), which also contains 
indications as to how the theory of partitions can be extended to deal with time and 
change. 
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can be identified as the mereological fusions of such minimal cells.2 
The corresponding minimal cells will, again in the ideal case, constitute 
a perfect tiling – a jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint 
decomposition – of the pertinent domain of objects, and each cell in 
such a partition is itself the mereological sum of some one or more of 
those minimal cells. 
Not all partitions have these nice properties however. This is 
because our partitions are artifacts of our theorizing and classifying 
activity and thus they are often incomplete. Thus we can imagine a 
partition of the animal kingdom containing a cell labeled mammal, and 
other cells labeled rabbit, dog, etc., which is yet not such as to 
represent a complete accounting of all the species of mammal which 
exist. There are gaps in the partition, analogous to the no-man’s-lands 
between the zones of civilization represented on ancient maps. 
Each partition will characteristically contain cells which are empty 
per accidens – because they have no objects located in them (as a 
chessboard will contain squares empty of pieces, and as a hotel may, on 
any given night, contain rooms empty of guests). Dodo is an empty cell 
in one standard partition of the animal kingdom. There are thus many 
empty cells within the domain of partitions taken as a whole. 
For some partitions, which we can call distributive, if object x is a 
part of object y, and if y is located in a cell z, then x is also located in 
that cell.3 Distributive partitions satisfy a principle to the effect that, if 
two objects are located in two different cells, then the sum of these 
objects is located in the sum of these cells. 
Spatial partitions are always distributive in the sense specified. If 
John is in Salzburg and Mary is in Salzburg, then their sum is in 
Salzburg and so, too, are all their bodily parts. A set, on the other hand, 
is a simple example of a non-distributive partition, and a partition 
generated by kinds or concepts, too, is non-distributive. A partition 
recognizing cats does not ipso facto recognize parts of cats. Moreover, 
if Bruno is a cat and Tibbles is a cat, then the mereological sum of 
Bruno and Tibbles is not itself a cat. 
                         
2 The latter then play the role played by singletons in the theory of classes as the 
mereological sums of singletons advanced in D. Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991). 
3 Here ‘part’ is to be understood according to the usual axioms of classical exten-
sional mereology, for example as set forth in P. Simons, Parts: An Essay in Ontology 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
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We can define the notion of recognition that is at work here as 
follows. We shall say that x is recognized by A if and only if A is a 
partition and x is located in some cell in A.  
Suppose John is recognized by a nominal partition A consisting of a 
single cell labeled ‘John,’ then this is consistent with its being the case 
that each member of a whole family of distinct though almost identical 
aggregates of molecules is recognized by A. This is because A does not 
care about the small (molecule-sized) differences between these 
different aggregates: it traces over John’s molecular structure. The cell 
John captures all the aggregates which are almost identical to John, but 
it does so in such a way that it cannot apprehend those different 
aggregates as different. Only a more refined partition would have the 
resources necessary to apprehend the differences in question. 
We now have the machinery we need in order to explain how the 
three sentences of our triad can be simultaneously true. All three 
clauses are retained; now, however, they take the following forms: 
 A*. The molecules inside John are parts of John. 
 B*. John is recognized by a partition associated with Mary’s act of 
seeing. 
 C*. The molecules inside John are not recognized by any partition 
associated with Mary’s act of seeing. 
The fact that the partitions available to Mary lack appropriately fine-
grained cells yields a solution to our puzzle which does not require the 
abandonment of the transitivity of parthood. 
5. Partitions, Sets and Fusions 
The notion of a partition hereby turns out to be in some respects a 
generalization of the notion of set, and we have in effect exploited an 
analogue of the transitivity-blocking feature of set theory in resolving 
our puzzle. A set is the ontological analogue of a mere list. The 
elements of a set exist within the set without order or location – they 
can be permuted at will and the set will remain identical. A partition, in 
contrast, standardly comes with a specific order and location of its 
constituent cells. Its cells fit together in a determinate arrangement, like 
pieces in a jigsaw or like molecules in a strand of DNA. 
Partitions differ from sets also in this: that there are many different 
sorts of partitions, reflecting the many different sorts of relations 
between objects and cells. Set theory, in contrast, as Lewis shows, rests 
on just one central relation: the relation between an element and its 
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singleton. Unfortunately, as Lewis himself confesses, this relation is 
enveloped in mystery: 
since all classes are fusions of singletons, and nothing over and 
above the singletons they’re made of, our utter ignorance about 
the nature of the singletons amounts to utter ignorance about the 
nature of classes generally. . . . What do we know about 
singletons when we know only that they are atoms, and wholly 
distinct from the familiar individuals? What do we know about 
other classes, when we know only that they are composed of 
these atoms about which we know next to nothing?4 
The machinery of partitions, in contrast, rests not just on one 
mysterious relation between element and singleton, but rather on a 
multiplicity of different (and quite unmysterious) ways we have of 
carving up reality. The relation between an object and its proper name 
is one such. Others include the relation between an object and its spatial 
location (for example in relation to a grid on a map), or between an 
object and a concept under which it falls, or between an object and a 
kind to which it belongs. 
Objects as they exist in nature stand to each other in various 
relations. They have hooks of various sorts, which link them together; 
these include common boundaries and they include relations of 
dependence and of functional or causal association. The operator of 
mereological fusion, when properly handled, preserves these inter-
object relations, and it thus preserves the order and location of objects 
which fall within its charge: if two objects are linked together in nature, 
then they are linked together also within their mereological fusion. 
A set is a mereological fusion of singletons, and mereological fusion 
preserves order and location. How can it be, then, that the elements 
within a set can be permuted at will and the set remain identical? The 
answer is that the set is built up mereologically not out of elements but 
out of singletons, and the latter are – according to standard 
philosophical conceptions of the nature of sets (which are in turn 
inspired by the axioms of set theory itself) – mere, homeless some-
things, outside time and space. The singleton operator has the effect of 
stripping away the various sorts of linkages which obtain between the 
objects to which it is applied and also of setting them apart from their 
surroundings and from time and change. 
                         
4 Lewis, Parts of Classes, 31. 
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Partitions are, now, distinct from sets however (and from 
mereological fusions) also in this: that they are not constituted out of 
(not made or built out of) the objects that are located in their cells. 
Rather, they belong to the level of our theorizing and classifying 
activity. Like maps, they can in an easily understandable fashion 
remain the same even though the objects towards which they are 
directed are subject to constant change. Moreover, it is no less easily 
understandable how distinct partitions can arise in relation to one and 
the same initial stock of objects. Some partitions are like sets in the 
sense that they will apprehend the objects which are located in their 
respective cells independently of order or arrangement or linkage or 
time. Other partitions, however, inherit from mereology the ability to 
comprehend their objects in ways which map the different kinds of 
relations that obtain among them. The cells in such partitions project 
their objects not in isolation, but rather in tandem with other objects 
located in related cells within the same partition. Such partitions will 
apply to pairs of entities only in reflection of the specific relations in 
which they stand to each other. John and Mary, before they wed, are 
not, but through marriage they become, located in the two-celled 
partition married pair. Yet other two-celled partitions, for example the 
partition capturing the relation between the two terms of an ordered 
pair, apply to pairs of objects only in reflection of our ways of 
conceiving them. A three-celled partition is needed to capture the way 
in which, in an action of kissing or congratulating, two objects become 
bound together by a third object – a relational event – in which the one 
occurs as agent, the other as patient. 
Partitions, as we have seen, have built-in granularity. The theory of 
partitions is thus unlike both mereology and set theory in that it has a 
direct and natural way of dealing with the fact that three-dimensional 
objects such as cats and human beings are many, but almost one.5 It 
thus also, again unlike both mereology and set theory, promises to offer 
a way to do justice to the ways in which three-dimensional objects such 
as cats or human beings can preserve their identity from one moment to 
the next even in spite of gaining and losing parts. A human organism is 
at any given time a certain family of distinct aggregates of atoms, 
molecules, and cells, but we are not in general aware of this fact 
                         
5 Compare with D.K. Lewis, “Many, but Almost One,” in Ontology, Causality and 
Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. 
Reinhardt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 23-38. 
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because, as we saw, the differences between the latter are traced over in 
our standard ways of dealing with them. 
Partition theory does not, in and of itself, give an account of what 
transtemporal identity – for example the transtemporal identity of 
human organisms – is. Rather it tells us what is involved when cog-
nitive subjects track identity through the sorts of changes by which 
human (and of course other) organisms are affected. If, however, the 
transtemporal identity of organisms is in part a function of the types of 
(small) changes by which they are affected from moment to moment, 
then the framework of partitions may provide a new path towards 
resolving the problem of what it is that makes it true that organism a at 
time t1 is identical to organism b at time t2, namely via an accounting 
of the sorts of (small) changes which affect (and which do not affect) 
the identity of the entity in question. 
The theory of partitions can do justice also, in a way that is 
precluded for set theory, to the phenomena of time and change. This is 
because, where sets are abstract entities existing outside time and 
space, partitions are human constructions which can be applied to the 
very same domain of objects at different points in time. In this way, we 
can construct entire histories of partitions tracking the temporal 
evolution of (for example) physical systems of different sorts at 
different levels of granularity.6 In this way also we can use the 
machinery of partitions to represent not only the way objects are related 
together at a time, but also how they evolve from one time to the next. 
6. A Coda on Realism and the Objectivity of Truth 
That scattered portion of the world that is made up of rabbits, that 
which is made up of rabbit stages, and that which is made up of 
undetached rabbit parts, are all three just the same scattered portion of 
the world. The only difference, as Quine sees the matter, “is in how you 
slice it.”7 What Quine does not recognize, however, is that there are 
two sorts of slicings: the bona fide and the fiat.8 Bona fide slicings 
reflect boundaries existing in nature, for example the boundaries of 
tennis balls or planets. Fiat slicings reflect boundaries which we 
                         
6 See Smith and Brogaard, “Quantum Mereotopology.” 
7 W.V.O. Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays 
(New York: Columbia University Press), 32. 
8 See the forthcoming B. Smith, “Fiat Objects,” Topoi (2001). 
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ourselves have introduced into reality through our more or less 
arbitrary demarcations, for example the boundaries of census tracts or 
tax brackets. Both kinds of slicing are represented in our partitions. For 
even though the cells of the latter are entirely fiat in nature – they are 
artefacts of our cognitive activities – some of them are coordinated with 
bona fide demarcations on the side of objects in reality. 
Different philosophers have different views as to which slicings are 
bona fide and which are fiat. Quine himself holds a view which implies 
that the metaphysical distinctions between continuants, stages and 
undetached parts belong in the realm of fiat slicings. Since reference is 
behaviorally inscrutable as concerns such distinctions – this is the 
moral of Quine’s ‘gavagai’ fable in Word and Object – Quine con-
cludes that there is no fact of the matter which they might reflect – no 
fact of the matter on the side of the objects themselves as these exist 
before we address them in our language. 
Notice that this is not an epistemological thesis. Quine must hold 
that even an omniscient being would be in the same predicament as you 
or me as concerns referential inscrutability. That is, he must hold that 
continuants, parts and stages do not differ from each other in virtue of 
any corresponding (bona fide) differences on the side of the entities in 
reality. Rather they differ from each other in the way in which, when 
asked to count the number of objects in the fruit bowl, you can say 
either: one orange, or: two orange-halves, or: four orange-quarters, and 
so on – and you will give the right answer in every case. The distinc-
tions in question are merely the products of our distinct slicings (our 
purely fiat partitions) of one and the same reality.  
But note that Quine is being too hasty when he asserts that there is 
no fact of the matter as concerns the reality to which we are related 
when using singular referring terms. For it follows from his own 
doctrine that it is a fact of the matter that this reality is intrinsically 
undifferentiated as far as the mentioned metaphysical distinctions are 
concerned. This is just the other side of the coin from the fact that the 
corresponding boundaries are entirely fiat in nature. 
Quine indeed comes close to a view according to which all 
boundaries on the side of objects in reality are of the fiat sort. Objects 
of reference, for him, can comprise any content of some portion of 
space time, however heterogeneous, disconnected and gerrymandered 
this may be. This is not so for Lewis, on the other hand, whose 
perspective on these matters we find more congenial: 
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Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most 
are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite 
minority are carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are 
established by objective sameness and difference in nature. 
Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as 
referents.9 
Elite things and classes are in our terms the things and classes 
captured by those partitions which track bona fide boundaries and 
relations in reality. It is the job of fundamental science and of 
fundamental metaphysics to move us in the direction of partitions of 
this sort. Even when scientists and philosophers have completed this 
job, however, there will still be room for partitions of the lesser sort, 
partitions which track boundaries – for example the boundary of 
Quebec, of Tibbles’ tale, or of the No Smoking Section of your favorite 
restaurant – which exist only as a result of our acts of fiat.
10
 
                         
9 D. Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984): 227. 
10 Thanks go to Berit Brogaard for invaluable assistance in the working out of the 
ideas in this paper. Thanks are due also to the National Science Foundation, which 
supported work on the theory of partitions under Research Grant BCS-9975557: 
“Geographic Categories: An Ontological Investigation” and to the American Philo-
sophical Society, for the award of a Sabbatical Fellowship. 
